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For theory and literature to evolve parallel to the subject matter which it associates, it recurrently 
progresses through admittance of variably incremental, yet critical, entries. This is the nature of 
modernism. This thesis reflects on one important point in the life of modernism, the advent at 
which society is first formalized and assimilated into theory: the origin of social theory, a point 
indisputably influential to twentieth century philosophy, but just eclipsed by one of that century’s 
most noticeable theoretical features. The past century saw the rise and fall of a universalizing 
framework called structuralism. Informing the disciplines, especially the social sciences, on 
unearthing matters of the unconscious, structuralism occupied a place of knowledge-generation in 
a world entering its atomic youth. The heirs of this framework are the poststructuralists, and my 
paper applies poststructuralism to pre-structural social theories. The purpose of this activity is to 
articulate the value dormant in these dated theories by recontextualizing their abstracted elements 
for a world ready to use them. The developed world has acquired a postmaterial status in regard to 
the necessities of survival, as Inglehart explains, while the developing world burdens to address 
materialist concerns in close contingency to cultural and traditional concerns. This opens up the 
discussion to a greater postmodern debate, one involving politics, economic status, cultural 
difference, and more. The international stage has consolidated a considerable level of liberty, but 
the semantics are often neglected in light of the success of convention. The purpose of this thesis 
is then to make an interdisciplinary, holistic attempt to reconstruct, exposing the relevance and 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.0 Purpose 
 The purpose of this paper is not only to depict manifestations of two intertwined concepts, 
dialect and dialectic, but also to portray those manifestations as possible compositions, possible 
configurations, of these two concepts at play. More specifically, those manifestations will be set 
in pre-structural frameworks found in the late-nineteenth century to the early-twentieth century. 
This time period enumerates the tense collisions of late modernity and the distancing variations of 
high modernism, and historically spans the widespread adoption of the industrial revolution 
through to the world wars, arguably the most tumultuous turns that the world and its social spaces 
had yet faced. The focus in this illustration will be the classical social theorists and their elemental 
understanding of society, specifically what made it “modern”. The assertions made for what 
definitively classify a society as modern is the most problematic aspect of these frameworks; in 
defining modern, the truly comparative component implicit to the social sciences is nearly lost to 
the historical partition. Resultingly, a structure emerged that held the potential to dissociate peoples 
on subjectively designated lines of societal arrangement. It is at this dissociation, or rather at the 
need for its reversing, that deconstruction becomes relevant. By deconstructing classical social 
theory, a poststructural practice is brought to pre-structural theories, taking the theories out of 
posterity and staging their potential integration into contemporary theory. With the postmodern 
debate as a foundation, its relativist underpinnings and reconstructive conclusions will help to 
expose the dilemmas of applying dialectics to materialism, especially socially. I employ metaphor, 
nearly metonymy, to make succinct this paper’s thesis; I refer to a society, or a type of society, as 
a dialect, and discuss classical social theory as a dialectic of dialects in need of reappraisal. 
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To situate this interdisciplinary array of late-nineteenth, early-twentieth century thought, I 
introduce both conceptually and linguistically dialect and dialectic. From there, I recount the 
classical social theories of Karl Marx (1818-1883) and Max Weber (1864-1920), emergent and 
critical theorists of die Moderne (Jameson 100), and contextualize them within my own 
framework. With the classical social theory’s footing being caught in materialist struggle for power 
and security in a nationalizing world, and with postmodern discourse emerging from postmaterial 
desires to uproot impersonal convention (Inglehart 36), the ultimate consistency of these social 
frameworks is bound to vary in its configuration.  
 
1.1 Of dialects and dialectics 
A pair of terms that exemplify the point of this paper are certainly dialect and dialectic. 
These terms will be illustrated in this section, and will form the basis of the argument for the 
remainder of this paper. While this section remains abstract and speculative, it does so in order to 
expose the etymological significance otherwise latent in the terms. The rest of the paper is more 
concrete but fundamentally depends on what is stated here.  
Dialect, the locality of language use, is something every person inherits from their 
surrounding world, an implicit force in their regular communication, and an unmistakable part of 
their identity. It is ultimately the manner by which we express our thoughts using language. There 
are seemingly countless dialects in existence, but still an indiscernible amount more have existed 
and been forgotten. Varying organically from place to place, dialects can be contingent enough to 
their neighbors to be rendered mutually compatible. Traditionally, peoples of a common language 
but different dialects have common ground to initiate a peaceful discourse.  
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 The word dialect comes to English through the French dialecte or the Latin dialectus, from 
the Greek διάλεκτος, “conversation, way of speaking”, itself from the Greek verb διαλέγεοθαι, “to 
converse”, literalized as δια-, “through, across”, λέγειν, “to speak” (“Dialect, N.” 599). So, we 
ultimately have as the word’s abstracted meaning, “to speak across” or “to speak through”. What 
is certain is that a reference to difference exists. With having “to speak across” borders (however 
arbitrary they may be), it can be assumed that there are in fact borders (of some form or another) 
to transgress.  
What is also present is a more implicated, more semantic, potential meaning that beckons 
to the notion of incorporation. To expand on the infinitive λέγειν, there are two other primary 
meanings to the Greek word that nuance its usage: they are “to gather” and “to count” (“λέγω” 
1033-1034). Both definitions seem to involve the incorporation of parts of a plurality, which itself 
implies that there definitively is a plurality. The connection between these two definitions and the 
one of central focus is one of proximity and can be elucidated through an elementary lesson from 
Aristotle’s On Interpretation; in speech, sentence formation requires the incorporation both of 
nouns and verbs (16b25-17a1); that is, in order to converse, one must step over boundaries of 
incorporated parts of speech. A matter may look one way to one person but another way to another 
person; the subject can be predicated differently. This is where this excursion gains its substance.  
Dialectic, an epistemic concern, plays a more distant role in people’s lives than does 
dialect. It involves criticism, either of personal opinions or, in the Kantian sense, of conceptual 
principles. To Kant, dialectics are extremes that do not compromise halfway, but instead remain 
irreconcilable. There is also a Hegelian sense of the word that pertains to the life of oppositions, 
be it historical or physical, at play. Ultimately, dialectics do not yield themselves readily to our 
senses, yet they are everywhere.  
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The word dialectic has a slightly different etymology than dialect, so I will address it here. 
Dialectic comes to English from the Old French dialectique, from the Latin dialectica, from the 
Greek notion of ή διαλεκτική τέχνη, “the art of discussion or debate” (“Dialectic, N. 1 and Adj.” 
599-600), itself from the Greek adjective διαλεκτικός, “pertaining to discussion” (“Dialectic, N. 
2” 600). To continue, I will focus on the Greek notion that meant “the art of discussion or debate”, 
because this usage articulates the distinction between dialectic and dialect.  
Where dialect is organic and sociable, dialectic is conditioned and removed. Whereas 
dialect is studied through linguistics and discourse analysis, dialectic comes to be understood 
through philosophy and logic. A notion of difference exists in dialectic, as I said of the case with 
dialect, earlier. But, the difference that a dialectic deals with is different in nature in comparison 
to the difference that a dialect deals with. The difference within a dialectic is dualistic, whereas 
the difference within a dialect is part of a pluralism.  
However, there is surely a shared space between the two concepts. It would be safe to say 
that, over the course of modernization, transcendental dialectics, concerning itself with ideals 
compatible almost exclusively with theological epistemologies, seems to be typically rendered 
illegitimate to most contemporary philosophers. It is next to impossible to find a philosophy that 
takes certain truths as indisputable without expanding on their justification; the point of 
philosophical works is to develop knowledge, not conceal it. So, as rationalism developed well 
into the early stages of late modernity, it unbound itself from the ties of its origin, the divine logos, 
and convened on a still more rational, discursive, rhetorical logos. Darwin, Freud, and even 
Einstein are major influences of this tendency, seeing as their theories have reshaped society’s, 
and so philosophy’s, conceptions of reality toward a much more mundane and physicalist 
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direction. But even in postmodernity, the authority of dialectics is further disputed through the 
poststructural rejection of discursive binaries.  
In the case with dialects, as we turn back to the consequences of modernization, there is a 
considerable decline in their diversification. Colonialization, as well as sudden decolonization, can 
have devasting impacts on the original diversity of native languages. The persistent pressure that 
an empire places on a locale can marginalize and diminish the native culture there, just as an 
unforeseen power-vacuum can devastate any fragile stability of some transcultural region. And 
neocolonially, languages and their dialects are constantly threatened by predominantly 
monolingual globalization, and this has spawned a postcolonial branch of linguistics, called 
language ecology, to study such endangerment of language diversity (Crystal 98).  
Though the teleological rationalization of modernity’s vacillating epistemes has staggered 
the stride of both dialect and dialectic, the two persist today despite. The concept of a world without 
dialect, one with only a single language, appears only in contemporary fiction, where it is the most 
appalling aspect of that world. Similarly, a world without dialectics, or knowledge of them, would 
mean for a world without opinion, the notion making its way into the same subgenre of fiction 
with the same stopping effect. We cannot step away from them either, though this may not be our 
intent in the first place; whether geographically or psychologically predominant, they are 
integrated into difference itself, forming the smallest units of our thought. 
 Our social spaces are governed by these units in that our interpersonal transactions are both 
self-produced and context-driven; they require an interplay of agency and structure, making both 
relevant to sociology. From as early as its disputative beginnings in mid-nineteenth century 
continental Europe, social theory has contributed an explication of social structure, enabling it to 
better inform social progress. Classical social theory attempted to look comparatively at a cross-
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section of peoples ultimately concluding that there are definitive differences among peoples, and 
that these differences are simple enough to be housed within a dialectic. As we will see, this 
theorization proves inadequate for, and potentially dangerous to, a truly comparative 
understanding of peoples.  
 
1.2 Dialectics of dialects: Classical social theory 
 Consider dialectics to be dynamic dichotomies, the constituents of which are two 
inseparable opposing binaries that interplay along some dimension, such as time or reasoning. 
Such dualistic tendencies often cast quite visible constellations of ideas that can be analyzed on 
simple grounds: that what is being witnessed is not truly as picturesque as it appears, that there is 
a definite reality beyond what is being witnessed, and that it appears in such a fashion because of 
the positioning of the observer. These conditions are created by the vast amount of space between 
the observer and each point in their sky. Stepping out of the analogy, there are certain fundamental, 
philosophical bylaws that must be addressed in order to compensate for the gap existent between 
epistemology and ontology, between the conception and object. Next, consider dialects to be the 
divisions of a language, organically differentiating as a people of a source language separate in 
space and time. Peoples take dialects with them as they might move about in spaces, whether 
geographical, ideological, economic, or any other type of space. Consequently, a discussion of 
something abstract like a dialectic comprised of dialects, would therefore be inclusive of the vastly 
differing tendencies of culture and society.  
Classical social theory, especially that of Marx and Weber, is grounded in a manner that 
allows for such a discussion. For these early theorists, the modern era is of primary focus. Marx’s 
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radical views criticized bourgeoise culture for their monopolization of industrialized economic 
spaces and vowed that eventually the dutiful proletariat will supplant the contradictory system as 
part of their world-historical mission. Weber held that society is pulled between two potential 
courses, one of communality and one of dexterity, the former generally exposing that scientific 
pursuit disenchants the world while the latter typically defending that science enhances the world. 
All in all, both classical social theorists hypothesized that there is something dichotomous about 
modernity, something which both divides and interferes with human beings on their pursuit to 
discover, understand, and develop their inner nature. I will continue to dissect these elements in 
the theories of Marx and Weber so as to reveal how each engages die Moderne’s recurrent impasse: 





CHAPTER 2: THE PRE-STRUCTURAL CENTER OF SOCIAL THEORY   
2.1 Marx 
 The original Marxian schema seeks nothing other than to liberate the working-class from 
an oppression that capitalists placed upon them through their contradictive ideology. To Marx, the 
constituents of any social space primarily invest themselves in economic ties to other parts. The 
economy has bound people, places, and resources inextricably together since the beginning of 
human history and will continue to do so regardless of the society under examination. In the 
capitalist economy of Marx’s day, one in which monopolistic capitalists were able to indisputably 
control the means of production, workers formed the popular majority of the social space. This 
alienated those that labored from reaching their deeper humanity, seeing as they were not in control 
of how they labored or of receiving their fair share of the enterprise. The logic of capitalism, Marx 
argued, was rudimentary enough to admit an accumulation of resources and laborers on behalf of 
the capital it created for the bourgeoisie. This same accumulation of the means of production would 
ultimately become capitalism’s downfall; this oppressed working-class, secured in number, would 
eventually hold the potential to overthrow the morally unjustified, politically contradictive 
authority. (Royce 21-53). This proletariat would seek to sever their unnecessary dependence on 
the bourgeoisie and establish a democratized economy (Royce 213).  
 So we may observe in Marx’s social theory that a largely materialist dialectic plays out 
between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. This may very well owe itself to the influence that 
Hegelian logical dialectics had on Marx and European thought as a whole (Cuff et al. 9). Humanity 
to Marx, however, was not centered in intellectual pursuits, as it was to Hegel, but instead in 
economy; and so, Marx proposed that there existed a materialist dilemma in which disparity 
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prevented human beings from attaining their connection to humanity. The danger of this alienation 
would subside after communism is instated. 
Marx’s materialist dialectic is a history of the past, in that it accounts for recurrent conflicts 
and tensions presented by historians, and it is a foretelling of the future, in that it predicts a 
revolutionary change. Up to the hypothetical point when the proletariat is to establish a socialism, 
the participants of history remain mostly complacent about their roles in society; other than short-
sighted rebellions and sparse liberational political revolutions, the groups of people that assumed 
the qualifiers “proletariat” or “bourgeoisie” had not yet entered the synthesis phase of a dialectical 
relation. The synthesis phase would not occur until the proletariats surmounted bourgeoise control, 
an event designated to some point in the future. For the time being, the two factions, like peoples 
of different dialects, would have to continue to live adjacently, inhabiting the same region, at least 
in a metaphorical sense, and sharing a core language.  
In terms of co-inhabitance, Marx’s vision of radical social change on a worldwide scale, 
one which involved a world without national borders or currency, seems to inevitably lead to a 
deleterious amount of upheaval, as twentieth-century world history has shown, and greatly 
contrasts with any mainstream liberal consensus in international relations theory. In other words, 
it is a shrouded path to achieving a new world order built on peace, equality, and governance on a 
global scale. Not only does there exist disagreement on precisely where the destination lies, but 
getting there all together seems to be an impossible task. Any hitherto employment of Marxism 
does not exact in fullness Marx’s ideals because the end has never been reached, only mirrored on 
a smaller scale. The materialist portion of materialist dialectics becomes ever more relevant when 
it is considered that, to the human being, space and time are finite, and the question of teleology 
becomes a conundrum: should the means meet the ends or should the ends meet the means? Where 
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is the compromise to be made? For the most part, a people’s history can only go one way, so the 
question of the correctness of any current path must be raised. More on this can be found in this 
work’s epilogue, where the postmodern debate is addressed. For now, however, it becomes clear 
with the classical social theorists, positivist as they might seem, that the physical sciences will not 
be able to solve problems of inequality, political difference, demographical struggles, and the like. 
Instead, it is common among these theorists to turn focus to an aspect of metaphysics, which, like 
the materialist dilemma, breaks off into a dialectic. 
 For Marx, the remaining dialectic exists between mythos and logos. Communism is often 
termed a world-historical mission. It is an exodus from a conformed way of life to one of 
uniformity. Its teleological ends can only be ascertained with monumental effort. This is why, 
Marx and his followers have often been depicted as Promethean; their ambitious attempt to acquire 
power for themselves and mankind is likened to the protest put up by the titan Prometheus in his 
stealing fire from Zeus for mankind. In his book Prometheus Bound, Leonard Wessel explains that 
Marx was a man of science but had generally mythic ambitions. More specifically, Marxism, 
sourced in a historical context, employs “a dramatic archetype of salvation in [its] socioeconomic 
terminology”. (38).  
 Mythos and logos have been, throughout modernity, isolated from one another. This is a 
source of great focus in the Romantic period; the Romantic tradition announces regrettably that 
logos has replaced mythos (Waterfield xi). Modern anthropology gives credit to mythos for being 
systematic like logos, but the two are distinct modes of thought owned by differing peoples: 
primitive and modern, respectively (xxiii). Structuralism gives a more relativist, yet universalist, 
outlook to the matter, placing both on the balance and calibrating. But classical social theory, 
preceding the widespread adoption of Saussurian thought, did not have the luxury of addressing 
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“sign systems” this way. These emerging theories would draw clear lines in the sand, but then 
nonchalantly cross them. 
What remains is another dialectic of dialects, one in which the answer to a materialist 
dilemma is a metaphysical escape. For Marx, this was a Promethean revolt against the bourgeoisie. 
When Marxism was picked up poststructurally, the line drawn in the sand had been effaced and 
people had been treading over it unassumingly. This means that Marxism has been readdressed, 
enabling fluid conversation between two previously bifurcated dialects: mythos and logos.  
 To recap, Marx’s original concern, that human beings have been alienated from their 
potential humanity, takes on the form of a materialist dialectic between two interlocked factions: 
the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. My claim is that situating this conflict, occurring between 
parties of distinctive qualities, as a similar social divide, one between two peoples of contingent 
dialects, allows us to relativize the situation and permit a theoretical deconstruction of the essential 
Marxian characteristics. Marx’s overstepping of the mythos-logos divide only reinforces our 
attempt to do so, because it encourages a convergent sociability between apparently differing 
conceptualizations, and so alleviating tension between peoples, albeit a different suit. This relation 
holds for the remaining classical social theorist. 
 
2.2 Weber 
 Where Marx encouraged the dismantlement of capitalism, Weber applauded its success. 
To Weber, the logic of capitalism was not contradictory, as Marx saw it, but instead alternative to 
a tragic human history that was wrought with conflicting ambitions. Though capitalism was 
discernably a rationalizing order, Weber’s sociology had great depth decentered from economy. 
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His theories were grounded in concepts already existent in German social thought, particularly 
Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft. The terms are generally translated to “community” and “society”, 
respectively, and each classifies a type of group of people that is oriented toward that form of 
sociability. (Waters et al. 3-6).  
However, literal translation yields different meaning, and since it tends to shine light on 
some nuance of key theoretical concepts to do so, I will embark on that brief excursion now. The 
first term, Gemeinschaft, doesn’t hold a negative connotation in Weber’s use of the term, but has 
potential for this when the word itself is analyzed. By itself, gemein is an adjective meaning a 
range of unfavorable descriptions, from “base, low, dastardly” to “lower-class”, but can also have 
a more neutral connotation if used to mean “vulgar, common” (“Gemein” 485-486). The second 
term, Gesellschaft, is in opposite seating in relation to Weber; he holds that it can disenchant the 
world, but the literal translation has only positive connotation. The noun Geselle translates to 
“journeyman”, “fellow”, or “companion” (“Geselle” 500). Finally, -schaft, the ending for both 
terms, denotes categories of sorted popular groups; put simply, -schaft is a suffix that groups 
people (“-Schaft” 3313). Something to point out here is that the meanings of these abstracted 
definitions reflect general movements in German thought at the time. Gesellschaft was favored 
over Gemeinschaft by many German intellectuals preceding Weber (Waters et al. 3-6). 
The majority opinion of Weber’s modern time was that Gemeinschaft was the past and that 
Gesellschaft was the future. Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft were viewed differently in Weberian 
thought; instead of these being static states which a people could assume, they were considered 
directions on a spectrum. Weber even wrote of them as processes, Vergemeinschaftung and 
Vergesellschaftung. Gemeinschaft came to refer to a society where interactions are close-knit, 
prestige-based, and dependable. Gesellschaft came to refer to a society where interactions are 
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detached and mercenary. The notion that history could hypothetically sway to one end of the 
spectrum disconcerted Weber, who believed that modern society could fluidly move between these 
states and ought to if it desired to avoid the sort of collective depression he called disenchantment. 
To retain common human values, Vergesellschaftung had to be curbed. (Waters et al. 3-6). 
 
“[The] process of becoming a rational Gesellschaft [Vergesellschaftung] has commonly reached far 
beyond the frontiers and boundaries of political communities, even when the reason for becoming a 
rational Gesellschaft was geared toward a joint use of military force [Gewalt].” (Weber 57). 
 
 Thus a serious materialist dialectic plays out between Vergemeinschaftung, the origin and 
means of all societal interactions, and Vergesellschaftung, the temporal and teleological end of all 
societal transactions. For Weber, almost writing wary of the nearing calamity of World War I, 
there was high exigence to depict society’s humane roots as something significant enough to be 
saved from the brush of the political logos he considered Gesellschaft. The dilemma exists in the 
inability to reconcile or compromise between two social forces: that of community ties and that of 
rational teleology. The centripetal Vergemeinschaftung is entirely incompatible with the 
centrifugal Vergesellschaftung, yet both must neighbor uneasily, creating an unsettling perspective 
for any proximal observer.  
 The materialist dialectic is news of the present, in that it reports on a current state of 
matters. Unlike Marx’s materialist dialectic, which was both a history of past and prophecy of 
future events, Weber’s theory tells us that we hold a certain status at any given moment but does 
not formulate a chronology based in archetypes applicable to other time periods. It adjusts the 
meter of preceding German social thinkers by recalibrating to a new center, Gemeinschaft, thereby 
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establishing uncertainty in place of an assuming certainty. Most importantly, it presents coverage 
within one of two bipartible trends while exposing value in both, fulfilling the need for informative, 
neutral reporting. To the end, Weberian thought is captivated by the present and captivates those 
in the present with its insights.  
 Weber’s theory is essentially an insociable dialectic consisting of ultimately sociable 
dialects. A neo-Kantian, Weber theorizes a dialectic of estranged constituents; like true Kantian 
dialectics, Weber’s dialectic involves interaction without dissolution. Additionally, the social 
focus of this theory brings any ideological divide among people closer to the established metaphor 
of a divided language. Separated through the process of distancing, dialects create exclusory 
circumstances for those who approach their boundary. The very labelling of Gemeinschaft or 
Gesellschaft creates a false sense of inhabitance or exile, of inclusion or exclusion. This inherited 
conception does a disservice to social theory by unnecessarily formulating an indominable 
incompatibility.  
 Weber’s social theory is a conflict theory. Like Marxism, it depicts a struggle between two 
“massive” bodies for dominance and predominance. With Weber’s social theory came a new 
disposition, but it was a disposition nonetheless. Without a theoretical synthesis of its fundamental 
entities, i.e. Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, or an analysis that brings about reconcilable terms, a 
social theory, rather than raising liberational propositions, will only ever confirm a despondent 
news of the world’s instability. With about a century of additional historical perspective, 
contemporary observers can attest to the dangers of committing to a worldview so divisive. To get 
to the root of this dilemma, attention should be turned to the source of his theory, which segues 
into his turning to metaphysics. 
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 There is, as there was in Marx, a sort of allusion to Romanticist principles. The 
Romanticists progressively rejected the Enlightenment and its rationalistic underpinnings, blaming 
it for intentionally abandoning the natural currents that carried man to the shores of consciousness. 
They held passion in higher regard than they did reason (Peyre 1). In a sense, Weber followed in 
this tradition, doing so a good century after the first cohort had found its widespread success. 
 “Weber: Rationalization, disenchantment and charisma” is a chapter in Julian Young’s 
book German Philosophy in the Twentieth Century in which it is stated that Weber is essentially a 
conduit for the Romanticist resistance against the rationalizing of society, and that Weber saw 
himself as occupying a historical moment at which point it had become necessary to revitalize 
freedom and meaning. The reason Weber opposes Vergesellschaftung is because its calculating of 
social spaces manifests as the deterioration of Gemeinschaft. As has been established, the trend in 
German social thought was to support Gesellschaft in order to rationalize society, and so Weber 
presented and represented a new turn in German social thought, one which sought to bring 
individuated liberty into terms with communal fraternity. To do this, Weber claimed that society 
must first overcome its collective depression, disenchantment, by embracing a charismatic 
authority. (7-18).  
 By placing his faith in charisma, Weber joins the classical social theorists in a flight from 
materialist obstruction. The flight takes them up to metaphysics and far from harmfully 
conventional viewpoints. In each classical social theory, there exists one materialist dilemma and 
one way out through metaphysics. Weber depicts the way out of the Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft 
conflict as through charisma, an unexplainable attraction that the masses have for a political figure. 
Furthermore, there is a double dialectic occurring, as there was with Marx. 
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 This dialectic occurs between charisma and scientific progress. The pursuit of genuine 
charisma, on the one hand, aims to sway large audiences into a livelier state; it makes use of 
rhetorical pathos. The pursuit of perfection in science, on the other hand, strives to bring 
individuals to a controlled enlightened state of mind; it makes use of rhetorical logos. Again, 
Weber was a neo-Kantian, so his dialectics do not involve synthesis. The logos-oriented science 
doesn’t dissolve into the pathos-oriented charisma, but instead produces a disenchantment that 
requires the latter to manifest. Additionally, keeping to my assumption, the pieces of this dialectic, 
upon further analysis, behave like dialects. Compared to one another, they exhibit difference in 
underlying ideology, they delimit the extent to which knowledges may grow, and they produce 
exclusionary force at their lines of separation. Though these facts may produce an aura of 
emptiness, Weber actually suggests that we leave the half-full glass be, that is, we accept how far 
science has already come, and we begin to fill the half-empty glass, that is, we accept a new and 
quite mythic charismatic figure to lead us to political stability and happiness. In terms of dialects, 
this means postponing the growth of influence of a pervasive dialect for the continuity of the other. 
It is essentially a call for truce and cooperation at a crucial moment. This is where Weberian social 
theory can be abstracted to help mitigate divisive circumstances; by preventing convention from 
commanding society to perpetually drift in one direction or another, a regulatory agent can 
recurrently recalibrate in accordance with the welfare of societal types. 
 To recap, Weberian social theory keeps a safe distance from what it perceives as a 
threatening influence, Gesellschaft, and desires to harbor the affected victim of the historical 
drama, Gemeinschaft. It becomes clear upon analysis that this materialist dialectic is problematic 
at its core; the citizen of the future should not have to choose between two fundamentally opposed 
ideals but instead be given a chance at progression to a more stable future. Explicitly favoring one 
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materialist entity over another will not get either party very far. However, if being devoid of change 
means the deterioration of one materialist entity, change by one side or another will surely be 
underway. To ensure welfare is brought to the social types, it is important that the deteriorating 
entity begin again to receive its fair share. In attaching the dialect metaphor to the dilemma, it 
becomes amply evident why such a welfare would work in everyone’s favor.  
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CHAPTER 3: EPILOGUE 
3.1 Conceptual difference 
 Difference reaches all spheres of existence. When difference polarizes, we often find 
ourselves reflecting on a dialectic. When a dialectic takes on a materialist guise, its constituents 
are polarized. The composition of a society can appear unstable when opposing values are found 
within close quarters of each other. Integration and synthesis have often been suggested by 
sociologists as correctional measures, but they largely overlook the most basic tenet of what is 
studied by the humanities: belief. Tolerance serves humanity well, but the implicit certainty arising 
from cultural beliefs may not always be a privilege that we are granted; to solve an array of 
disasters, crises, and tensions, a sober rationalism may be in our best interests. Should we too 
hastily rise to the task, convincing ourselves that we work contingent to a true teleology, we forget 
our original intentions, whether cultural or political, and in an exercise of autonomy circumvent 
our values. To go beyond the physicalist shortcomings of a rationalist overstepping would mean, 
to some, to reassume a metaphysics, returning us safely to a cultural beginning, should 
politicization of the social domain not have censured this refuge. Alternatively, endorsing 
postpositivism would create a mediary between human values and scientific knowledge, at the cost 
of culturally founded belief. An incessant series of categorical overturnings is bound to ensue if 
some mitigating factor does not enter the scene, yet it is improbable that rescue will arrive from 
an external source. To overcome the discussed materialist dilemmas philosophically, critical 
theory has aimed to philosophically amend otherwise divisive social theory. This paper has 
discussed dialectics in terms of dialects, so it seems fitting to conclude by readdressing them 
conceptually and linguistically. 
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3.2 Conclusory thoughts 
 Toward the beginning of this paper, I had discussed dialect and dialectic as concepts and 
words. After isolating a stage in the development of dialectics, a very important one in German 
modernity (die Moderne), it is important to set those prior-standing definitions against what has 
been discovered. Structuralism, after all, was sourced in linguistics and held that concepts, or rather 
utterances (énonciation), have centers; and poststructuralism, far from dismissing structuralism, 
critically readdressed the nature of those centers (Lyons 6; Angermuller 2). With dialectics having 
a history within German philosophy, it is only fitting to regard dialectics as a center. In answering, 
“What is a dialectic?”, I did so in context of answering the question, “What is a dialect?”, only to 
reveal the sharp contrast between the usage of the two given their overlapping linguistics. 
Ultimately, the dialectics of classical social theory cannot accommodate for what dialectics itself 
acknowledges unless they are deconstructed; proletariat-bourgeoisie and Gemeinschaft-
Gesellschaft do not “pertain to discussion” or “speak across” difference until center is recognized 
as play, encouraging perpetual resurfacing and subduction by means of flowing currents capable 
of such regulation, a conception that has gone largely unarticulated but with further attention can 
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